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ANTITRUST AND THE CONGLOMERATE
MOVEMENT: AN ALTERNATIVE FROM
THE REGULATED SECTOR
HENRY A. EINHORN*
INTRODUCTION

Antitrust policy towards conglomerates assumes a new dimension when
one considers the application of antitrust laws to the regulated sector.'
Traditional antitrust criteria have been the tests of "substantial anticompetitive impacts" in these "regulatory agency-antitrust" conflicts. But
the anticompetitive impacts must be weighed against other, perhaps more
important, considerations in determining the net "public interest. ' 2 A
similar procedure is suggested for evaluating true conglomerate situations.
This public interest objective is unique to the regulated sector, but its
extension to conglomerate situations requires less radical legislation than
other proposals designed to restrict conglomerate activity.
Given the multitude of actual market contexts within which conglomeration might occur, there can be no simple, unambiguous impact of the
conglomerate movement. All that can be accomplished, then, with any
degree of intellectual honesty, is to ascertain central tendencies or general
relationships, and to structure antitrust policy accordingly. However, general
aggregative studies cannot delineate the impact of a given conglomerate
relationship. More detailed analysis is required and, even then, a number
of relationships will defy reliable analysis.3
* Professorial Lecturer, Graduate School of Business Administration, The American
University. Office of Economics, Federal Power Commission. B.S., Syracuse University,
1954; M.A., Columbia University, 1957; Ph.D. Columbia University, 1963; Economist,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1960-1961. The viewpoints are solely the
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1The application of antitrust to regulated companies has many of the characteristics
of a conflict and precious few that would suggest the smooth orderly evolution of public
policy. Several aspects, including the public interest objective, were considered in Einhorn,
Regulatory Agency-Antitrust Relationships, 83 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 21 (1969).
2 Regulation most frequently has developed in response to conditions that seemingly
required a monopolistic market structure. Regulatory agencies generally are expected to
replace monopolistic market behavior with an approximation of competitive pricing - that
which provides a maximum of output consistent with "normal" returns. Thus, regulatory
commissions seek the general competitive objectives as well as some additional performance
goals peculiar to each industry. The regulatory commissions function under statutory
language unique to the regulated sector: that of recognizing the "public interest" as the
primary objective of the regulatory-antitrust interaction.
SThis is clearly suggested in the regulated sector where conglomeration might
adversely affect the safety of the essential regulated service, e.g., by permitting the intermingling of funds from the regulated activity with the more risk-oriented capital of the
unregulated sector. In addition to affecting the efficient provision of consumer service,
such action could create higher barriers to entry and seriously influence effective market
power.
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The increasing concern (and continuing uncertainty) over the conglomerate movement's ultimate impact has led to serious proposals concerning
the restriction of conglomerates, including the application of antitrust laws
or per se standards of illegality. 4 Time and controversy inevitably have
obfuscated both the merits and limitations of these policy alternatives.
Consequently, a brief review of these alternatives can provide a context
for considering a procedure comparable to that followed in the regulatory
sector.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND PER SE PROHIBITIONS AS
CONSTRAINTS TO CONGLOMERATE EFFORTS

The applicability of antitrust to conglomerate companies must be con.
sidered for two separate, but interrelated circumstances: (1) internal de.
velopment via company diversification, and (2) external growth via the
acquisition of other companies. Each method encompasses three classes of
conglomerate activity: product extension, market extension, and pure conglomerate activity. While the basic conglomerate character and corporate
functions may be identical, the relevance of antitrust enforcement depends
largely on whether the growth is internal or external. The clearest instances
of antitrust applicability are suggested by the external acquisitions characterized as product extension and market extension mergers. These seem
5
clearly to be covered by section 7 of the Clayton Act as it relates to the
restraint of potential competition. This interpretative coverage of potential
competition probably is as desirable as it is (inevitably) controversial.
Potentially anticompetitive conditions should be constrained even at the
risk of precluding some beneficial developments. The net social cost of
dissolving anticompetitive situations after the fact probably is much greater
than the cost of a preventive program that inadvertently precludes situations
without anticompetitive impacts or with some net benefits. 6
There is considerable doubt as to whether internal diversification of
the product extension or market extension classes (short of monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act 7 ) is covered by the antitrust statutes.
Internal efforts are not covered by section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
involves only acquisitions. Nor does section 5 of the Federal Trade Act'
seem relevant; its proscriptions of unfair practices have been permitted to
4 See, e.g., 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CoNC. Rc.
5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969); Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers,
13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1361 (1968).
5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
6 This view reflects (I) the rather inordinate amount of time required for settlement
of antitrust issues, and (2) the difficulty of framing long delayed remedies in a meaningful
manner.
For a rather comprehensive consideration of antitrust remedies, see Elzinga, The
Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 43 (1969).
7 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
8 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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atrophy, and in any event, its application in this situation would involve
an unprecedented substitution of an enforcement agent's judgment for
management discretion. Similarly, the ,Sherman Act is not particularly
suited to conglomerate efforts since it -isdirected toward monopolization,
and the tests of monopolization are far more rigorous than those of trade
restraint. In any event, the applicability of the Sherman Act would stand
on its own merits and not be related to conglomerate considerations. Pure
conglomerate diversification via internal techniques is even more unlikely
to involve antitrust considerations; for all practical purposes, and barring
any incriminating evidence suggesting unlawful intent, internal efforts are
simply not promising targets of antitrust enforcement.
In contrast, acquisitions offer a potentially fruitful area for antitrust
enforcement. Enlightened enforcement, however, requires adoption of improved models of markets that would further illuminate the importance of
potential competition. It may be appropriate to forestall elimination of
potential competition, but such competition is relevant only when actual
competition is deficient. The existence of meaningful competition diminishes
the competitive importance of the incremental firm involved in a conglomerate acquisition. The difficulty of evaluating competitive conditions in
antitrust situations has been described elsewhere, but it is compounded in
the more ambiguous context of conglomerate markets. 9
As yet, we have not developed an adequate analytical model in conglomerate market situations, by which one can examine such functional
interrelationships as product line, relevant markets, and expected or alternative lines of business behavior. The absence of an adequate behavioral
model for use in such instances only compounds the absence of meaningful
objective measures for describing and ranking the extent of competition in
antitrust situations. An almost necessary concomitant is an inability to
determine the marginal impacts of basic structural changes upon market
behavior and performance. This is the principal constraint to evaluating
the significance of the structural and behavioral alternatives in controversial
industry situations.
Many conglomerate cases are not amenable to an analysis of "anticompetitive" situations; the most controversial cases frequently involve
companies related only in a very peripheral fashion. Thus, the public's
attention may center upon apparent financial manipulation or behavior
lying within the letter, but not the implicit morality or spirit, of the law.
Ideally, some of these problems can be countered by measures specifically
tailored to meet them; improved disclosure rules are to be preferred to
antitrust enforcement as a means of allaying the concern that the formation
of conglomerates reduces the amount of information available to the public,
deludes investors, and so forth.
An evaluation of opportunity costs should underlie the selection of all
9See, e.g., H.

ErNHoRN & W. SMITH, ECONOMIc AsPETs OF ANTITRUST (1968).
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appropriate public policies, but these costs cannot yet be meaningfully
specified for conglomerate situations. Clearly, such measures must reflect
the impact of each policy on growth, income distribution, and other critical
aspects of our economic goals. The absence of a useful model becomes even
more important in this context. Conglomerate acquisitions undoubtedly
encompass a full range of competitive impacts. This should spur greater
efforts to delineate the alleged benefits announced for each new conglomerate situation. Such benefits may be very real probabilities (even in a
statistical sense), but they have been quite poorly presented to the courts
in antitrust situations. 10
Generally, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to formulate and
implement legislation that would prohibit only those conglomerates having
negative impacts. Consequently, many have suggested broad per se prohibitions of those conglomerates exceeding predetermined parameters. The
particular constraints have varied, but the principle and objectives are the
same for each proposal."
The attractiveness of per se prohibitions is enhanced by (1) the scarcity
of antitrust investigative and enforcement staff, and (2) the popular presumption that adverse economic performance is associated with conglomerate structure. 12 Unfortunately, these studies are aggregative in nature,
and do not permit reliable a priori evaluations of specific conglomerate
efforts. The beneficial effect of broad prohibitions is provided by their
economical impact upon enforcement time and effort. Per se prohibitions
probably encompass the same number of clearly anticompetitive situations
as would an effective case-by-case evaluation program. One suspects that any
marginally anticompetitive conglomerate acquisitions covered by per se
rules would be at least offset by the automatic preclusion of some conglomerate efforts that could have proved beneficial. Limited per se rules represent
a compromise of sorts. Although the guidelines promulgated by the Justice
10 Despite the acumen underlying its complex interrelationships, the business sector
has been very inept in defending the need for those proposals challenged on antitrust
grounds. Most frequently, these defenses amount to a denial that any other arrangement
could function equally well. Even a cursory examination of these allegations suggests their
amorphous character. The economic benefits of intercorporate resource use stem from
the actual use of those resources; the ownership structure does not affect the real value of
these resources.
11 See Campbell & Shepherd, supra note 4. See also Address of Attorney General John
N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
50,247 (1969), suggesting that the Department of Justice probably would oppose any mergers by one of the
top 200 manufacturing firms with another member of this group or with a leading
company in a concentrated industry.
12 See S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY (1968); CABINET COMMI'rEE ON
PRICE STABILITY, STAFF STUDIES, Paper No. 2 (Jan. 1969); FTC, STAFF ECONOMIC REPORT
ON CORPORATE MERGERS, in 5 TRADE REG. RE'.
50, 262 (Nov. 1969).
Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Committee on the Judiciary have provided a wider dissemination of additional studies
regarding this alleged adverse economic performance.
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Department 8 and the Federal Trade Commission 14 officially approach this
compromise, neither has been tested in the courts.
Traditional neoclassical economic models provide little assistance in
evaluating either the immediate or long-run aspects of conglomerate transactions. Even in analyzing antitrust cases in nonregulated industries, the
courts have recognized that accurate and fully quantified forecasting is
neither required nor feasible. 15 The more tenuous interrelationship and the
range of feasible conglomerate impacts can be evaluated only by considering
the likelihood of many possible consequences. Ideally, this would be provided by a full Bayesian analysis; however, ideal solutions are not reasonable possibilities in analyzing real world problems. Generally, some less
precise and more informal judgment is utilized in reaching the reasonable
conclusions that comprise antitrust enforcement.
ANTITRUST STANDARDS

AND

REGULATED

INDUSTRIES

The regulatory sector's experience with antitrust provides a number
of precedents and lessons for the application of antitrust to conglomerates.' 6
13 The Justice Department guidelines, issued at the close of the Johnson Administration, have remained dormant during the current administration. See Department of
Justice press releases of January 26, 1968 and May 30, 1968 for statements on the merger
guidelines based on market shares and the nonbinding premerger opinions. The current
administration has suggested an absolute prohibition against mergers by the largest
companies. See note 11 supra.
14 The FTC's merger guidelines for specific industries have been provided in a series
of press releases. On January 31, 1967, guidelines were released for the food distribution
and cement industries. FTC, FOOD DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRIES GUIDELINES, in 1 TRADE REG.
4520 (Jan. 17, 1967); FTC, CEMENT INDUSTRY GUIDELINES, in 1 TRADE REG. REP.
REP.
4510 (Jan. 17, 1967). Subsequent guidelines have been issued for grocery products,
manufacturing, and textile mill products. FTC, GROCERY PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING GUIDELINES, in 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4530 (May 15, 1968); FTC, TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS INDUSTRY

GUIDELINES, in 1 TRADE REG. REP.

4540 (Nov. 27, 1968).

15 See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1963), wherein
the Supreme Court stated:
Unless we are going to require subjective evidence, this array of probability
certainly reaches the prima facie stage. As we have indicated, to require more
would be to read the statutory requirement of reasonable probability into a
requirement of certainty. This we will not do.
Since the trial court might have been concerned over whether there was evidence
on this point, we reiterate that it is impossible to demonstrate the precise competitive effects of the elimination of either Pennsalt or Olin as a potential
competitor.
See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967), wherein the Court noted:
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of
market power in their incipiency. The core question is whether a merger may
substantially lessen competition, and necessarily requires a prediction of the
merger's impact on competition, present and future. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321.
The section can deal only with probabilities, not with certainties. Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, supra, at 323; United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378
U.S. 158. And there is certainly no requirement that the anticompetitive power
manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called into play. If the
enforcement of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices,
the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be
frustrated.
16 These precedents also include situations in which commissions have the power to
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The application of antitrust laws to regulated industries often has been
subordinated to the regulatory authorities' responsibility to regulate in the
public interest. This marriage of antitrust and regulation has been forged
both by legislation and by a series of judicial rulings that competitive
conditions comprise a substantial (but not the only) aspect of "the public
interest." In a nonregulated industry situation, substantial anticompetitive
impacts constitute violations of antitrust laws which are "against," or violative of, "the public interest." On the other hand, in regulated industries
which are not exempt from antitrust enforcement, violations of the law
are not synonymous with a determination of "the public interest"; the
regulatory authorities can regard any factor as sufficiently important to
override substantial anticompetitive impacts.' 7 However, the judiciary has
grant exemptions from the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission
v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1968) wherein the Court
stated:
Congress has, it is true, decided to confer antitrust immunity unless the agreement
is found to violate certain statutory standards, but as already indicated, antitrust
concepts are intimately involved in the standards Congress chose. The [Federal
Maritime] Commission's approach does not make the promise of antitrust immunity meaningless because a restraint that would violate the antitrust laws will
still be approved whenever a sufficient justification for it exists. Nor does the
Commission's test, by requiring the conference to come forward with a justification for the restraint, improperly shift the burden of proof. The Commission must
of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding under one of the four
standards of § 15, but once an antitrust violation is established, this alone will
normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is "contrary to the
public interest," unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight
of this factor.
17 The Supreme Court has required the full application of antitrust principles to
determine whether the antitrust laws have been violated by the existence of one or more
anticompetitive impacts. Such antitrust violations constitute a substantial part of the
"public interest" criteria that should be served by regulatory agency opinions and ruling.
'Itshould be noted, however, that other considerations might override these antitrust
violations and support the approval of the otherwise undesirable arrangement. The
nature and existence of these overriding considerations must, however, be stated and
justified by those seeking the benefit of this exception to the general principle. See United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), wherein the Court stated:
First is the question whether the burden of proof is on the defendant banks
to establish that an anticompetitive merger is within the exception of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(5)(B) or whether it is on the Government. We think it plain that the
banks carry the burden. That is the general rule where one claims the benefits of
an exception to the prohibition of a statute. Federal Trade Commission v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-45. The House Report (No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.)
makes clear that antitrust standards were the norm and anticompetitive bank
mergers, the exception: ". . . the bill acknowledges that the general principle
of the antitrust laws - that substantially anticompetitive mergers are prohibited
- applies to banks, but permits an exception in cases where it is clearly shown
that a given merger is so beneficial to the convenience and needs of the community to be served - . .that it would be in the public interest to permit it."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 366.
The courts are not left at large as planning agencies. The effect on competition
is the standard; and it is a familiar one. If the anticompetitive effect is adverse,
then it is to be excused only if "the convenience and needs of the community to
be served" clearly outweigh it. We see no problems in bringing these standards
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been increasingly strict in its acceptance of the particular consideration
offered as "overriding."18 Benefits will not be considered as overriding if they
can be obtained through alternative procedures or agreements that do not
infringe upon antitrust law. Only then can these benefits be evaluated to
determine whether they are sufficient to overcome the substantial anticompetitive impacts.
This procedure provides a vehicle for evaluating the contrasting conglomerate forces in a flexible manner. Conglomerate relationships are more
tenuous than horizontal or vertical merger situations, but these relationships
can be evaluated effectively by focusing on their "net" economic impacts.
While this permits companies to rebut an anticompetitive finding, it places
a far greater burden upon the companies to identify benefits and to prove
the necessary superiority of their programs. The difficulties will be at least
comparable to those currently encountered in the regulated sector.
The elements critical to an examination of potential competition are
discussed in the context of potential competition cases in the unregulated
sector, and in some recent antitrust decisions involving regulated industries.
The standards of the former and the evaluations of the latter are the
substance of antitrust analysis required in the conglomerate sector. The
former cases provide the broad standards applied by the judiciary, while
the latter pivot on the weighing of competitive and other considerations to
determine the public interest. Admittedly, there is no "public interest"
mandate in the antimerger law, even where conglomerates are concerned;
but the evaluation of conglomerate situations requires just this type of net
judgment. Under these circumstances, the evaluation of competitive impact
is not susceptible to the yardstick or proxy measures used in vertical or
horizontal mergers. Of course, subsequent development of monopoly market
power would be susceptible to attack under the Sherman Act.
One issue remains particularly unresolved and controversial in considering conglomerate efforts or acquisitions: the disposition of mergers with
a neutral potential impact, i.e., those having neither anticompetitive nor
pro-competitive effects. This problem remains a source of conflict within
the regulated sector. Regulatory agency interests frequently approve prointo the area of judicial competence. There are no constitutional problems here
not present in the "rule of reason" cases.
Id. at 369-70.
Judge Wright's opinion in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 599
F.2d 953, 959-61 (D.C. Cir. 1968), contains a very compact but quite thoroughly documented examination of the relevance of antitrust law to regulatory agencies.
18 United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 189 (1967), wherein
the Court noted:
But this analysis puts aside possible ways of satisfying the requirement of
convenience and need without resort to merger. If the injury to the public interest
flowing from the loss of competition could be avoided and the convenience and
needs of the community benefited in ways short of merger but within the
competence of reasonably able businessmen, the situation is radically different. In
such circumstances, we seriously doubt that Congress intended a merger to be
authorized by either the banking agencies or the courts.
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posals that offer no unique beneficial impacts if they are similarly free of
negative impacts. In contrast, advocates of active antitrust enforcement
generally will take the opposite position under such circumstances.
Depending upon who bears the burden of proof, decisions to approve
(or condone) mergers will vary even if the same checklist of relevant factors
is considered in each situation. If the burden of proof rests on the merging
firms to show the benefits of a merger, the outcome will differ from similar
circumstances in which the merger's opponents carry the burden of proving
negative impacts of the merger. Thus, a "neutral" impact merger would be
approved less readily if the parties were required to substantiate net or
unique benefits. This procedural point is emphasized because the evidentiary burden is a particularly important determinant in the gamesmanship of both judicial and quasi-judicial regulatory proceedings. Since
the economic philosophy is unambiguously pro-competitive, with monopoly
power tolerated only under stringent conditions, it is not unreasonable to
require proof of unique benefits as a first step in evaluating the merger of
separate regulated monopolists or in evaluating conglomerate situations.
Antitrust deters the deliberate erosion of competitive market forces
and provides a direct challenge to anticompetitive market situations, but
antitrust per se does not directly stimulate the market process. The competitive market process receives its stimulus from lowered barriers to entry in
noncompetitive markets. Many significant entry barriers have developed as
a concomitant of the institutionalization of government policies; for example, tariffs restrict competition from foreign producers while, closer to
home, regulatory constraints shield monopolists from technological competition. Many of these public policy objectives can be secured without
restricting competitive sales efforts. Elimination of these market obstructions would stimulate competition without reducing regulatory effectiveness.
The regulatory sector's recent experiences with antitrust indicate that
agency staff must apply its technical competence in this direction, e.g.,
merger applications must be evaluated in the context of technological
alternatives; thus, benefit and cost trade offs must be identified and evaluated
for each alternative. 19 The significance of antitrust as a statement of basic
public policy must be recognized by the regulatory authorities. This principle has received consistently increasing emphasis in recent judicial opinions,
suggesting that mere lip-service to competition will not be tolerated by the
19

Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comnl'n, 399 F.2d 953, 973 (D.C. Cir.

1968), wherein the Court stated:
Moreover, the duty imposed upon the Commission by Section 7 of the Natural
Gas Act is not merely to determine which of the submitted applications is most
in the public interest, but also to give proper consideration to logical alternatives
which might serve the public interest better than any of the projects outlined
in the applications. Udall v. F.P.C., 387 U.S. 428 (1967); City of Pittsburgh v.
F.P.C., supra, 99 U.S. App. D.C. at 123, n. 28, 237 F.2d at 751 n.28; Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., supra, 354 F.2d at 617-620. See generally Reich,
The Law of the Planned Society, 75

YALE

L.J. 1227, 1248-1251 (1966).
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judiciary. This concern can be extended to limit all market constraints
created by, but not required for, the implementation of public policies.
Extension of this concern for competitively beneficial programs would
provide a greater stimulus to competition than would most proposals to
restrain conglomerate efforts.
CONCLUSION

Current public policy does not provide effective evaluation and control
of conglomerate companies. Neither the application of traditional antitrust
law nor the per se prohibition of conglomerate acquisitions provides the
necessary flexibility. Of the three types of conglomerate activity, only the
product and market extension are types covered by traditional antitrust
laws; the pure conglomerate is not reasonably susceptible to antitrust enforcement. Moreover, antitrust embraces only conglomerates developed
through external acquisition; internal diversification is not constrained
by (the civil sanctions of) antitrust statutes.
Conglomerates are characterized by several market impacts of both a
beneficial and harmful character. Effective market solution is provided
when each conglomerate situation is evaluated on its own merits; this
procedure fully recognizes the heterogeneous nature of market situations
in which no single market impact will be dominant. For this reason, conglomerates should be evaluated on a "net" basis. This procedure is used
to evaluate antitrust problems in regulated industries where policy decisions
must serve the public interest. Additional legislation is required to evaluate
conglomerates on this basis, but such statutory authorization would be less
radical than that required for other proposed restraints on conglomerates.
As a general rule, anticompetitive market potential is reduced more
effectively when actual competitive forces are encouraged than when simply
constraining anticompetitive forces. Competitive forces are strengthened by
government policies whenever those policies are implemented without
creating unnecessary market barriers. Implementation of public policies in
this manner would reduce potentially anticompetitive conglomerate impacts
by providing a sounder and more competitive economic environment.

